Architects of Long Change

The Expert Roots of Post-Socialism in Czechoslovakia (1980–1995)

Michal Kopeček (ed.)

KAROLINUM PRESS VÁCLAV HAVEL SERIES

Architects of Long Change
The Expert Roots of Post-Socialism in Czechoslovakia (1980–1995)

Michal Kopeček (ed.)

———

Published by Charles University, Karolinum Press
Translation by Gerald Turner
Cover and layout by /3. dílna/
Typeset by Karolinum Press, Czech Republic
First English edition

Originally published in Czech as *Architekti dlouhé změny: Expertní kořeny postsocialismu (1980–1995)*, Prague: Argo, 2019

Czech edition reviewed by Milena Bartlová (Academy of Arts, Architecture and Design in Prague), Martina Winkler (University of Bremen)

This book was funded by the Czech Science Foundation as part of the No. GA15-1427S grant at the Faculty of Arts Charles University and the Institute of Contemporary History of the Czech Academy of Sciences.

The publication was issued with the support of the Czech Academy of Sciences.

Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available from the National Library of the Czech Republic

© Karolinum Press, 2026
Text © Adéla Gjuričová, Michal Kopeček, Václav Rameš, Petr Roubal, Matěj Spurný, Tomáš Vilímek, 2026
Translation © Gerald Turner, 2026

ISBN 978-80-246-6117-9
ISBN 978-80-246-6118-6 (pdf)
ISBN 978-80-246-6119-3 (epub)



Charles University
Karolinum Press

www.karolinum.cz
ebooks@karolinum.cz

Architects of Long Change

The Expert Roots of Post-Socialism in Czechoslovakia (1980–1995)

Michal Kopeček (ed.)

KAROLINUM PRESS



FACULTY OF ARTS
Charles University



Czech Academy
of Sciences



CONTENTS

Preface to English Edition **11**

Introduction (Michal Kopeček) **15**
Neoliberal hegemony as a hypothesis **17**
Experts in existing social-science and historical research **25**
What the reader will find in the book **36**
Acknowledgements **46**

Ruling by Law: Czech Jurisprudence from "Repressive Legality" to the Rule of Law, 1969–1994 (Michal Kopeček) **53**
From Stalinist "jurisprudence of terror" to the "civic socialism" of the Prague Spring **60**
The normalisation of rule: jurisprudence and "socialist legality" as instruments to manage and discipline society under the Husák regime **67**
"The rule of law" in the name of socialism? **83**
Legalistic revolutions, legal continuity and the origins of liberal constitutionalism **99**
Conclusion **114**

Enterprise Management in Czechoslovakia from Socialism to Capitalism (Tomáš Vilímek) **129**
From "purges" to perestroika – socialist managers in the 1969–1985 period **132**
From "restructuring" to demolition – corporate management at the end of the 1980s **136**
The functions and position of the enterprise manager before 1989 **149**
Produce or "play the plan parameters game" **151**

Political commitment and creating the impression of "a trustworthy comrade" **154**
Enterprise management and the intra-enterprise coalition **161**
The post-socialist manager "under fire" in the early 1990s **165**

From the Socialist Theory of Management to Neo-Liberal Managerialism (Michal Kopeček and Václav Rameš) **193**
The boom of socialist management theory in Czechoslovakia **201**
The socialist management theory of the 1970s and early 1980s **204**
From "socialist competition" to the "sense of being a socialist manager": management theory at the time of perestroika **209**
Management science at the time of building capitalism after the democratic revolution **213**
Conclusion **219**

The Transformation of Socialist Man into the Liberal Individual? (Adéla Gjuričová) **231**
More prolific than one might think **238**
Advantages of invisibility **243**
At what price? **248**
Against hierarchies **252**
The golden nineties **256**
Therapeutisation: it is a question of where and how **259**

Criticism, Management and Business: Social Research and Sociology as Tools of Governance in Czechoslovakia after 1969 (Michal Kopeček) **271**
Social research and sociology as part of authoritarian governance in late socialism **277**

The sociology of the socialist enterprise and public opinion research **284**
From a sociology of socialist lifestyle to a civil society paradigm? **291**
"Social therapy" or a critical mirror of society? Sociology in the liberal democracy of the early 1990s **301**
Conclusion **318**

Between Science and Politics: Ecology in Socialism and Capitalism (Matěj Spurný) **331**
Man and his home: the transformation of sensibilities at the end of industrial modernity **340**
Contradictions in the relationship of state socialist governance to environmental protection **343**
Experts, activists, dissidents and social movements before November 1989 **351**
Averting catastrophe: ecology's finest hour at the turn of the 1990s **363**
The star fades **367**
Ecology between marginalization and economization **371**
Conclusion **380**

Planning Prague in the 1980s–1990s: The Self-Destruction of Urban Planning Expertise (Petr Roubal) **391**
The crisis of modern socialist urban planning **393**
Perestroika and the Prague city planning discourse **402**
The Battle over Žižkov and Stromovka **407**
Anti-communist urbanism: planning expertise after 1989 **419**
Conclusion **431**

List of Abbreviations **441**
About the Authors **442**

PREFACE TO ENGLISH EDITION

Translating a book that analyses a specific historical era into a foreign language shaped by entirely different sociopolitical and cultural circumstances always presents significant challenges. Many terms in contemporary Czech and English exist within distinct semantic fields and are used in different contexts despite often being considered interchangeable. Unlike German, English lacks established definitions for certain key ideological terms of late socialism, as no English-speaking socialist country existed where such nomenclature could naturally develop. While translation into English is essential for comprehension, directly substituting a Czech term with its English counterpart does not always convey the contextual nuances necessary for a deeper understanding of the text. To preserve these subtleties—such as the distinction between the more Western-sounding *"managers"* (*manažeři*) and the more traditionally socialist *"leading economic staff"* (*vedoucí hospodářští pracovníci*)—the original Czech terms have occasionally been included in brackets within the English translation, with their contextual differences explained either in the main text or in the endnotes.

In some cases, an arbitrary decision on how a term should be translated into English had to be made. The Czech word *podnik* can refer to a private enterprise, but it was mostly used in reference to the socialist, i.e. state-owned ones. On the other hand, the word *firma* had not been employed in the socialist context at all and started to be used only after the 1989 revolution in reference to private businesses. English lacks an equivalent pair of terms distinguishing similar entities operating in two fundamentally different socio-eco-

nomic systems. To maintain clarity, *podnik* is consistently translated as "enterprise" or "state-owned enterprise", while the English word "firm" is reserved for private firms only. For stylistic variation, the English word "company" is sometimes used for both types.

Other terminological difficulties have a deeper historical background. For instance, the term *Rechtsstaat* is a more precise translation of the Czech *právní stát* than "rule of law", as it better reflects the continental European legal tradition from which the concept originates. The idea of *Rechtsstaat* emerged in German legal thought and refers to a state bound by law, where governance is structured through legal principles and institutions. In contrast, the rule of law is primarily an Anglo-American concept, which, while emphasizing legal constraints on power, emphasises individual rights and legal precedent rather than a systematic, state-centred legal order. Despite these conceptual differences, the term "socialist rule of law" has become increasingly common in legal and historical scholarship when discussing the legal system of late communist Eastern Europe. It is also linguistically more accessible in English. For these reasons, while "socialist *Rechtsstaat*" may be the more accurate term, "socialist rule of law" is also used in the book, with distinctions made where necessary.

Furthermore, one key term ought to be explained at the very beginning. The term "normalization" is commonly used by all the authors, together with the "normalization period", "consolidation period", "post-1968-invasion era" etc., with equal meaning. Originally referring to the first phase of the late socialist period (app. 1969–1971), which was marked with purges and political offensive of the communist hard-liners against the real or alleged "revisionists", the term "normalization" gradually became a general label for the whole of the 1970s and 1980s. The authors of all chapters employ the term extensively when referring to the last two decades of communist rule, respecting the common usage of the term in the contemporary Czech and Slovak public and expert discourses.

We decided to keep the original abbreviations derived from Czech words even in the English translation (e.g. KSČ for *Komunistická strana Československa* or PAS for *Pokroková architektonická skupina*, "progressive architecture group"), in order not to create unnatural acronyms that did not exist in the era. An exhaustive list of abbreviations is given in the Appendix, and all abbreviations are explained upon their first occurrence in the text. This approach also applies to references to archives and their fonds, where we retain the original Czech names and document titles. This ensures that readers can independently locate these sources using the references provided in the endnotes without the need to translate them back into Czech when communicating with the archives.

This book is an English translation of a monograph originally published in Czech in 2019. Since its initial release, the body of scholarly literature on late socialist governance, expert communities and their roles in both late socialism and post-socialism, the plausibility of the neoliberal hegemony thesis, and various other related topics have expanded significantly. This growing body of research has introduced novel perspectives and incorporated a wide range of newly analysed sources. Despite these developments, the authors are convinced that the present volume remains a meaningful contribution to our understanding of the rapid transition from late socialism to post-socialism. The core arguments and analytical positions put forward in the book require no major revision. Each chapter is grounded in extensive archival research, and most of the documents and collections utilised by the authors have not been subjected to scholarly analysis since 2019. Although this lack of further in-depth research is far from ideal, it underscores the continued relevance of the book's findings and offers an opportunity to present them to an international audience.

INTRODUCTION
Michal Kopeček

One of the most widely discussed topics in contemporary history and the social sciences is the nature of the systemic changes in East-Central Europe since 1989. Was it a "democratic", "liberal", "neoliberal" or "capitalist" revolution? What permitted the rapid transformation in the 1989–1990 period from a universally-shared and supported "democratic revolution" to a reputedly elitist "liberal hegemony" based on representative democracy, privatisation and a capitalist "market without adjectives"? How did "neoliberal governance" achieve such notable success in the 1990s in countries whose elites were partly recruited from among the democratic activists of the anti-Communist opposition that emphasised the autonomy of civil society and social self-organisation?

It has been clear for some time now that there is a need to revise the prevailing scope of research both into the end of the Cold War and the communist dictatorship in 1989, and into the beginnings of democracy and capitalism after 1989. Although there is a consensus that western civilisation and democracy are in the process of fundamental change, the contradictory nature of the political order and the changes that are felt as acutely by people in Czechia as in most of the Western world and the former Eastern Bloc, require different perspectives for our thinking about contemporary recent history, and what immediately preceded the situation we are in today. Moreover, the fairly liberal access to archival sources in the Czech Republic creates exceptionally suitable conditions for this.

The need to historicise and redraw the basic contours is increasingly evident in both major narratives: the unsustainable teleolog-

ical vision of "democratic transformation", and the self-affirming identity narrative of the inevitable collapse of the communist dictatorship in Czechoslovakia and Eastern Europe. Were we to rid recent history of at least some of its legitimizing responsibility it could be possible or even necessary to view the developments of the last third of the 20th century in the much broader context of the "modernising dictatorships" in East-Central Europe, and maybe broader still – that of the West and its transition from organised modernity to post-modernity: "the age of fracture".[1] From that perspective, the history of our region will not look unequivocally like a deviation from some imaginary "natural" historical development, but rather as a variant or parallel evolutionary branch of comparable modernising, transnational and globalising processes.[2]

The present collective monograph seeks to contribute to such a change of perspective. It analyses the "expert forms" of late socialist governance and their legitimation before 1989, as well as the transmission of expert knowledge and political and social management practices during the rebuilding of the democratic order. It seeks to historicise the current social-science and political debate about the alleged neoliberal hegemony that replaced the Communist dictatorships after their collapse. It is based on the premise that what is sometimes termed "neoliberal governance" was not simply the product of imported western political and cultural models but also of numerous intellectual, mental, social, and cultural continuities from the period of late socialism. These assumptions and hypothetical continuities during the period of "long-term systemic change", dating roughly from the early 1970s to the end of the 1990s, are the central focus of the individual studies.

Neoliberal hegemony as a hypothesis

One of the most influential research hypotheses conceptualising the question of continuity or discontinuity between late socialism and post-socialism can be termed the theory of neoliberal hegemony. It differs in several respects from earlier analyses of post-communist transition. First, unlike other studies of post-Communism and transformation, its subject matter is not so much the emergence of capitalist society on the ruins of state socialism, but rather the incursion of neoliberal ideology into Eastern Europe after 1989.[3] According to this hypothesis, the various institutions and politicians associated with the names of Ronald Reagan or Margaret Thatcher, or the ideas of Friedrich von Hayek or Milton Friedman can in no way be equated with the market economy. From this perspective, neoliberalism is viewed more as a somewhat experimental (in terms of the restructuralisation of the post-war welfare state), socially unjust (compared to the so-called Scandinavian model, for instance), and probably inefficient (particularly in respect of social capital) means of transition from "Marx to the market", as a virulent mutation of western capitalism, which was nevertheless adopted in the post-communist countries as a matter of course, as the natural order of things, to which "there was no alternative" as British prime minister Margaret Thatcher liked to say.[4] At the same time neoliberal globalisation considerably undermines the resources of states to tackle rapidly growing social and economic inequality. As Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz famously maintained in his critique of the International Monetary Fund, the current process of globalisation, as directed by transnational financial institutions and capital, constitutes "global governance without global government."[5]

The critique of the "neoliberal revolution" offered a new perspective on the position of Eastern and Central Europe within the global order. In revealing the logic of the global power relations

implicit in the concept of "post-communist transition", these approaches perceive the capitalist restructuralisation of the region as a unique "laboratory of the future", in which the most important global players test their policies on the periphery of modernity before introducing them at home.[6] Such interpretations that oppose established cold-war polarities and the division of the world into the rich North and poor South, conflate the fiscal crisis of late socialism, the strict deficit regimes introduced in the countries of the third and former second world, and the recent crisis of late capitalism in its western heartland.[7] Attention is also focused on certain features common to the opposition to neoliberalism in various parts of the peripheral world, such as instances of populism in the region on the one hand, and new social movements, on the other, which are construed as expressions of global protest against the neoliberal consensus.[8]

This perspective on the global system of power and the experimental testing was also combined with a critical exposition of how post-socialism operates at the micro level. Whereas previous considerations of transformation viewed the process of extrication from the state socialist morass as a more or less successful effort to minimise the detrimental effects of previous sovietisation and create the conditions for a return to "normality", this new approach saw nothing "normal" in the post-socialist restructuring process. Inspired by the ideas about social order and subjectivation of a number of thinkers from Karl Polanyi to Michel Foucault, the critics of neoliberalism took to heart the idea that capitalist society and its actors had first to be created (and would not emerge organically as traditional historical narratives would have us believe) if capital economics is to function. These authors then observe how seemingly specialised, expert or managerial discourse is transformed into disciplinary institutions and educational/training programmes aimed at the production of post-socialist or neoliberal subjects.[9]

The interpretation of post-socialism as the triumph of neoliberalism was extremely influential in a section of the international academic community. It was nevertheless the object of criticism from various quarters, on the grounds that what was needed was a more consistent historicization of the question. Research into "political capitalism", for instance, whose analysis is based on economic and political indicators rather than on high-flown ideas and political rhetoric, sums up the results of the post-1989 period of transformation in East-Central Europe by use of the eloquent term "varieties of capitalism".[10] The main argument of its supporters is that there are many types of capitalism in this part of the world, from a more continental European social-corporatist model to hybrid and uncoordinated (unbridled) forms of capitalism. It is therefore scarcely possible to speak of the victory of one particular liberal or neoliberal model. Another type of critique of the neoliberal hegemony thesis is based on ideological analysis. According to this approach there is only very little empirical evidence of radical and ideologically-motivated neoliberal transformation, let alone of local enthusiastic acceptance or endorsement of allegedly neoliberal recipes coming chiefly from economic institutions of the so-called Washington consensus, such as the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund.[11] In other words, it is necessary first of all to prove the existence of a coherent neoliberal ideology in the region after 1989 and reveal its main protagonists in politics, the economy and culture before it is possible to defend the thesis of "neoliberal hegemony".

There is now a broad interdisciplinary field of research into the emergence and development of neoliberalism with many offshoots that are sometimes poles apart and often even in contradiction with each other. A fairly developed and conceptually compact component is the intellectual history of neoliberal thinking that focuses on the once marginal neoliberal movement centred

on the so-called Mont Pèlerin Society and the Chicago School of Economics; in the 1970s it became one of the main challengers to the post-war Keynesian consensus before establishing itself as the economic mainstream in certain countries and international organisations, particularly in the field of economic policy.[12] A number of other authors associated with various branches of post-Marxism and critical theory have tried to identify the links between economic thought and practice from the end of the 1970s that led to changes in the practices of governance in contemporary advanced western societies.[13] Although these studies are less conceptually coherent, they have had a considerable impact because of their critical attitude to the current excesses of global capitalism. Equally compelling are approaches that perceive the neoliberal order as lived experience within the power structures and discursive practices of everyday, consumer, "late-capitalist" society, which contributes in no small measure to the creation of the present-day "neoliberal subject".[14] Irrespective of their differences, most of these approaches draw on Michel Foucault and his analysis of "biopolitics", or his concept of governmentality as their original inspiration.[15] As is evident from this purely typological overview, the very concept of "neoliberalism" is problematic, since it encompasses a whole series of phenomena, from the history of economic doctrines, where it signifies anti-Keynesianism within the broad liberal ideological current, to political philosophy with a strongly rationalist, moral and legal significance (symbolised by such figures as Friedrich von Hayek or Robert Nozick), and everyday social and cultural practices and disciplinary institutions, both formal and informal, constituting a web of meaning and subjectivation techniques typical of the contemporary "neoliberal order".[16]

Likewise from a broader historical perspective that doesn't focus solely on the last forty years but considers the evolution and historical transformations of capitalism within a longer time frame, the

theory of the current neoliberal hegemony appears one-sided at the very least.

In sociologist Peter Wagner's well-known interpretation and long-term vision of the growth and transformations of western modernity since the 18th century, the 1970s and 1980s are viewed as the "second crisis of modernity," or a crisis of so-called organised modernity.[17] Other similar approaches see neoliberalism as part of broader social and cultural trends of "late modernity", such as post-modernism and the associated crisis of historicity, the fragmentation of society and its major metanarratives, and the de-industrialisation of the West, but also as the beginning of Marxism's decline as an alternative vision of the world, as well as the crumbling of Western patriarchy, which was previously unassailable, and the onset of a new phase of globalisation.[18]

Similarly, historians' and historical sociologists' renewed interest in the history of capitalism as a global historical phenomenon fairly naturally views neoliberalism as one of many trends that have shaped capitalism into what it is today.[19] At the same time, from a long-term historical perspective, "real capitalism" is too complex, multi-faceted, malleable and variable a historical formation to be characterised with a single epithet. There can be no historical research into capitalism without Marx as analyst. But a thoroughly neo-Marxist perspective also retains from him the vision of doing away with capitalism, a vision that is sometimes not over-optimistic, as witnessed by the approach that regards contemporary "managerial capitalism" as a hybrid transition between classical capitalism and a new socializing form of society.[20]

From another neo-Marxist perspective, rejecting the term "real socialism" for the socialist organisation of society, there was only a slight difference between state socialism and capitalism, which also helps explain the relatively easy transformation after the fall of the one-party dictatorships in Eastern Europe.[21]

In our view, a fairly major deficiency of the approaches dealt with here so far is that most of them focus on Western societies, or their ex-colonies, and from there they project the impact and implantation of neoliberalism onto a semi-peripheral area, which includes Eastern Europe, without substantively studying this part of the world. The handful of persuasive studies of our geographic zone that have so far appeared show that the thesis of neoliberal hegemony is helpful for historical research of our circumstances. At the same time, it has its limits, too. I'll try to illustrate this by reference to a book by the German historian Philipp Ther, which, thanks to its fairly rapid appearance in translation, has had a similar reception in Czechia as it did in Germany.[22] Drawing on the tradition of comparative social history, Ther has tried to paint a broad picture of the emergence of the "new order" in Europe, particularly East-Central Europe, since 1989. One of the many merits of his approach is that it transcends the disciplinary boundaries of Eastern Europe specialists and encompasses Germany (not just its eastern part) and Austria in order to emphasise the common economic, social and cultural processes taking place in the "West" and "East" of Europe since the 1970s. But the strength of this approach, namely reflecting common social processes in a relatively wide geographical area, encompassing several distinctive societies with quite dissimilar political cultures, is also its weakness from another perspective. In short, it is unable to permit the simple operation that is at the heart of the historian's craft, namely allowing individual or collective historical actors to speak in their own language. It cannot afford to focus on the political negotiations behind the transformation in individual countries that are highly politically diverse, otherwise his exposition would be unclear and unmanageable. And yet it is precisely the "history of the meaning of 1989" and what followed that year, that is, in my view, one of the central tasks of historians specialising in contemporary history.[23]

In this sense, in spite of his efforts to "historicise" the history of transformation, Ther remains to a certain extent trapped within the expert social-science language of "transitology", which, figuratively speaking, regards the "transition countries" with appropriate detachment and measures their "performance" on the basis of pre-set or occasionally set "Western standards" (as in the case of the so-called Copenhagen criteria for joining the EU). Thus, he provides us with one of the best accounts to date on how the former communist countries became part of the "neoliberal order on the old continent", without, however, showing us the political and sociocultural languages in which those fundamental changes were articulated, and experienced. Attempts at such an analysis have started to appear, focusing understandably on economic experts, particularly political economists, but also heads of financial institutions, or leading figures of the economic reform. Several very good studies explain in a detailed way the dynamics of local politics and the international environment of financial and regulatory institutions, as well as more or less successful endeavours to "root" capitalist transformation culturally in local environments.[24] They realise that the ideological transfer greatly depends on the extent to which certain assumptions are rooted in domestic social networks and depend on the existence of a large enough group of "translators" capable of processing the current ideological "import" and adapting it to local circumstances. By definition the results are always hybrid forms of "neoliberal capitalism", since detailed comparison reveals that de facto no typical neoliberal model exists, since each of them is dependent on the pre-existing conditions in specific cultural and social environments.[25] At the same time, however, these studies continue to be the fruit of the default setting of social-science research, which, while aware of the importance of the past (in the form of prevailing discourses, existing social norms, or the robustness of transnational social networks),

fail to research that past but merely establish it in the form of so-called path-dependency analyses, i.e. dependence on paths already entered upon (in the past).[26]

What our research team found more inspirational were studies that deal substantively with the pre-capitalist – i.e. chiefly late-socialist – past, and the role of experts. For these studies 1989 is neither the starting point nor end point of their analysis.[27] Without this perspective, as I try to show below, it is impossible to explain the historical roots of the "neoliberal shift". In the aforementioned literature, "neoliberal governance" is generally defined in terms of several main elements: the dominance of the market at the expense of employment (trade unions, tripartism, etc.); long-term cuts and deregulation of public expenditure; privatisation as the main instrument for creating or strengthening the main social stratum of responsible owners; replacing the concept of "public wellbeing" as the fundamental principle of socio-cultural cohesion with the principle of "individual responsibility" and "individual initiative".[28] The latter principles were in line with or even the inspiration for the main thrust of the transformation policies of the new liberal-conservative political elites (particularly the ODS and ODA) in Czechoslovakia and Czechia at the beginning of the 1990s. They presented their policies as a clean break with the communist past and a rejection of any potential "third way". At the same time, however, it was not – and could not be – an abrupt introduction of neoliberal ideas into the virgin soil of socialist society. The essential elements of the mindset and practice of neoliberal governance emerged from the political and economic thinking, mental patterns, and cultural and social practices of late socialism. The rise of technocratic and specialist strata of "technocratic" or "managerial socialism", the growing importance of a socialist corporate sector as a counterweight to state – and particularly party –structures, the individualisation and atomisation of social life during the period of normalisation,

and the concomitant increase in the value of private and non-formal relations and principles of trust ("familiarity") at the expense of public commitment – all these aspects may be considered as the conditions for the emergence and effect of the ways and means whereby societies and states in East-Central Europe were managed and controlled after 1989.[29]

The now very extensive research into neoliberalism and supposed neoliberal hegemony in post-communist Eastern Europe was a stimulus for us. Moreover, as will be evident, it was inspirational in various ways for the individual studies. At the same time, our book does not seek to contribute to the theory of neoliberal hegemony. Our sole focus is on one stratum of actors of a specific historical period, one that has tended to be neglected for a long time by historiography in spite of its importance, namely, experts and managers. And in view of the above-mentioned reservations, our research sought to be an analysis of "the expert roots of post-socialism" and not of "the expert roots of neoliberalism." We wanted to base ourselves on a more neutral hypothesis, one that was possibly less attractive, but more open to interpretation.

Experts in existing social-science and historical research

The experts and managers of the late socialist period and early 1990s have so far seldom been the subject of historical research. Nonetheless we are not starting entirely from scratch. The crucial role of experts and managers in the transition from a centralised state-controlled economy to a market economy, or from party dictatorship to liberal democracy, was noted by contemporary actors and later by social-science literature. At the beginning of the post-communist period it was precisely the expert, managerial or bureaucratic elites, unlike the former dissidents of Charter 77 and other opposition groups,

who knew how to "run the state". Even before the democratic revolution, their comparative advantage in terms of the knowledge and practice of management was discussed by the dissident sociologist Jiřina Šiklová in her famous essay on "the grey zone".[30] She presciently foresaw how quickly the dissidents, as heroes of the revolutionary moment, would be displaced by experts and technocrats when it came to building a new order. The concept of the "grey zone" for which Šiklová did not claim authorship, went on to make a career of its own in social-science and historical research, just like another concept from that period – "political capitalism", with which another sociologist and former dissident Jadwiga Staniszkis tried to encapsulate the "nomenklatura privatisation" of state property that had been proceeding for some time in Poland.[31] To a certain extent, managers, along with experts, featured from this perspective in transitological literature. I do not intend to summarise the literature on this topic here, since each of the authors of the subsequent studies drew inspiration from diverse sources depending on their particular focus. Instead, I would like to indicate here a number of more general research trends of interest to us. One of them, represented mostly by sociologists and economists, has tried to analyse the process of "building capitalism without capitalists" or the emergence of "capitalism with a Comrade's face".[32] Sociological analysis of the foundations of the post-socialist, capitalist economy based on the model of managerial (state) capitalism with many features inherited or adapted from state socialism and others imported from the West, or the globalising financial world, chimed in well with the political debate occurring at the same time about "nomenklatura privatisation", or the pros and cons of shock therapy. That research also showed that in socially relevant numbers it was not actually the party nomenklatura but middle-ranking technocratic managers who benefited most from extensive privatisation and capitalist construction in the former communist states of East-Central Europe.[33]

Also close to our topic are the various approaches to the changing social role of the intelligentsia, which have often been viewed from a politically and socially committed position that critically discusses the alleged sell-out of intellectuals to the new capitalist order, but which also examines their rapidly declining social prestige[34] The less socially committed background to these reflections was provided by numerous contemporary sociological and historical works depicting the broader socio-cultural and socio-economic preconditions for the transformation of the intelligentsia and the formation of post-communist elites in general.[35]

This and other literature, influenced chiefly by the sociology of knowledge, or the sociology of intellectuals defines expert groups or specialist communities from differing perspectives.[36] As a rule, experts are defined on the basis of a specific specialised discipline or group of expertise, be they neuro-biologists, political economists, urban planners, or security analysts. Crucial for expert identity is specific communication within the discipline and a corresponding language, as well as distinctive methodology and assignments within the academic community governed by the management structure or society in general. Expert communities (but not necessarily their individual members) typically adopt an apolitical stance towards the status quo, or an apolitical stance across the discipline. In other words, in spite of the various political persuasions of the individual members of the same milieu, they are linked by shared knowledge and expert discourse, and mostly also by objectives and underlying methodological assumptions. Inspirational for us in our own research was a shift in recent years within a certain part of contemporary sociological research from intellectuals and their prosopography, to the study of "social interventions" of specific groups characterised by expert knowledge.[37] Such authors distinguish between specific intellectuals or experts whose legitimacy derives from their expertise in a given field, and "public intellectuals", whose status derives,

by contrast, from a position of "lay" intervention in many spheres of human activity, which are also part of public or political discourse. Hence some argue for a specific "sociology of expertise" that will focus on the efficacy of specific knowledge, or expert interventions in society at particular historical moments, rather than on the expert group, its development, coherence, and identity.[38]

Another useful concept has emerged from a different research milieu, that of "epistemic communities", which partly overlaps with the concept of expert cultures and also with the concept of ideological traditions or trends. It first appeared in the early 1990s in the field of international relations research. In that context the epistemic communities were characterised as transnational groups of experts that transcended expert disciplines and were defined in terms of shared epistemological approaches, as well as partly in terms of value hierarchies and shared social and political goals. Hence it is not a matter of belonging to a single professional community, such as sociologists, but rather communities that are formally or informally defined in terms of ideology or issue, such as neoliberals, globalists, or the international anarchists' federations.[39]

In sum there is a fairly extensive supply of analytical approaches to "expert groups" that also partly draw on resources from the post-socialist Eastern Europe. They are mostly the work of sociologists, who have analysed the transformations of the intelligentsia, the formation of new or re-established elites and their status in a changing social structure, as well as changes of mentality and local socio-cultural practices. Much less developed, on the other hand, are analyses of the historical roots of these expert elites, and the evolution of individual expert groups and their discourses about the organisation, management and socio-cultural legitimacy of government. A partial exception is the history of economic thought, which, in view of the central role of economic restructuring in the transformation of the social order, has triggered a need

for self-reflection in different fields and also attracted some interest from professional circles, particularly in international comparative research. These studies greatly contributed to our knowledge, however, their authors are fairly understandably mostly economists connected to one side or another of the controversies about economic transformation in the past decades. For that reason, they reflect arguments closely linked to the disputes of the time about the character of transformational economic policies.[40]

From the other end of the imaginary timeline, we drew heavily from historical studies on the late communist dictatorship in Czechoslovakia and Central and Eastern Europe. As part of that literature shows, various professional milieus often played a not inconsiderable role at the time of *perestroika* as a period of fundamental reconstruction and in defining the new social contract in the wake of the democratic revolution. Naturally the attention paid to those actors of change is more developed in countries with "negotiated" regime change, such as Poland or Hungary, where the institution of "round tables" rendered those groups much more visible in public life.[41] Yet some works in our domestic context also highlight their role such as Milan Otáhal's reconstruction of the emergence and impact of the so-called Circle of the Independent Intelligentsia, which successfully demonstrates the ambiguous situation of the experts on the borderline between the official culture and criticism of the regime; it also outlines the shifts within professional communities that were spurred by the final phase of *perestroika*.[42] Likewise Michal Pullmann's theses on the dissolution of the existing "ideological consensus" as a condition for its "revolutionary" replacement by an alternative political narrative have an important expert component, particularly in the field of economic policies, but also law, for instance. He also highlights the ambiguous position of experts operating in a particular ideological "authoritative discourse", who contributed by the use of seemingly non-ideological language to the

"quiet pluralisation of subject matter" that created the potential for system change.[43]

Relevant to our interest in experts is the dynamically evolving field of research into the history of technocracy and of the closely-related theme of expert knowledge. Internationally it stems from interest in transnational history and the beginnings of the new phase of globalisation, or the beginnings of the "knowledge society" associated with the second half of the 19th and first half of the 20th century, which obviously has a significant European dimension.[44] Questions about the transnational dimension and dialogue that transcended the borders of opposing camps during the Cold War are also a central motif in current international research on "socialist experts". Throughout the Cold War experts were the main actors of (non-Soviet) internationalisation at various levels of international organisations of the UN and many other supranational bodies, regulatory institutions, expert commissions, research projects, etc., and they played an important role as mediators between national, regional and international environments.[45]

International research has its local counterpart in the study of technocracy in our country, particularly in the 20th century. Attention has focused on the beginnings of technocracy in the first half of the century and also on various aspects of technocratic management and expert disciplines in connection with the emergence and formation of the welfare state in Czechoslovakia.[46] Another area of technocracy and expert governance is dealt with by research on the planning of scientific development, or large-scale projects for regulating the economy and nature.[47] Considerable attention has also been paid in the recent period to technocratic tendencies in reform communism in Czechoslovakia in the 1960s, including in connection with the activity of the well-known multidisciplinary teams at the time of the Prague Spring.[48]

Technocratic governance trends were the subject of a study by Vítězslav Sommer dealing with planning, forecasting and futures research, and a study by a member of our team, Matěj Spurný, describing the scope and limits of technocratic modernity in the period of state socialism as demonstrated by the relocation of the North-Bohemian town of Most.[49] This research has given rise to a hypothesis about the so-called "technocratic socialism" as an important but still neglected component of communist governance throughout the post-Stalin period.[50] A collection of studies of this type has been published almost in parallel with our own collection and in a way both books can be regarded as mutually complementary parts of a mosaic.[51]

While the majority of these studies point to the complex and multifaceted relationship between political power and expert communities during the communist dictatorship, they less often attempt to address the question of the nature of "expert governance". This is dealt with aptly in relation to "expert paternalism" by Hana Havelková in her case study on the role of the State Population Commission.[52] The relationship between communist power and the expert community went through a number of phases, from the suppression of several social-science disciplines at the turn of the 1950s to their re-integration into policy-making in the second half of that decade. In Havelková's view this was centralisation and decentralisation at the same time. The influence of specialists on policy-making was undeniable; at that time experts were without doubt a distinct actor in social processes with a certain degree of autonomy and scope to influence central political decision-making. And yet, throughout the period their professional activity was centrally directed and monitored, and it was subordinated to ideological dictates. As Havelková demonstrates in the case of the "expropriated voice" of the feminist movement, the expert communities found themselves in a position in which, apart from their main research and knowledge-related

functions, they could also represent the voice of non-existent or pacified social movements (in this case the women's movement), by articulating some of the presumed needs, and thus fulfil an important "substitution" role. Although professional communities naturally did not cause the suppression of the voices of civil society, at the same time they acquired much greater importance in the system of ideological dictatorship. "The civic concept of interest was thus negated twice over: on the one hand by its suppression, and on the other by a deliberate creation of a hetoronomous substitute. If it is appropriate to refer to communist rule as state paternalism then one can with good reason speak also of expert paternalism."[53]

Expert communities also play an important role in some of the above-mentioned studies in relation to the theory of neoliberal hegemony. From our point of view this is important, because in contrast to all the previously mentioned literature these authors note the role of experts both in late-socialism and in the period of building parliamentary democracy and capitalism. Quite naturally then, they conceptualise the question of the continuities and adaptability of those groups at a time of fundamental social change. In her intellectual history of neo-classical economics and its longstanding intensive dialogue with Marxist political economy with particular reference to Hungary and Yugoslavia, the historian Johanna Bockman has attempted to deconstruct the mental dichotomy of the Cold War (the market versus the centrally planned economy) and demonstrate not only the continuous connection of neoclassical economic theory with centrally planned economies, but also the ever present interest of East-Central European economists in market mechanisms, not only at the time of reform communism in the 1960s, but also later.[54] The author shows that the practically continuous transnational dialogue in neoclassical (not neoliberal) economic theory and entirely within its conceptual framework – which was also acceptable for most of the time for economic theorists from the communist coun-

tries – slowly but surely created within this expert community a pro-market (again not neoliberal) consensus, which, however, paved the way for the future powerful impact of the so-called Washington consensus and a readiness to embark on radical economic reforms of the "shock therapy" variety.

This approach to conceptualizing the evolution of expert groups is inspirational for Hungary, for instance, where several authors are drawing on Bockman's study in effort to show the link between changes in the expert milieu of political economists, particularly those associated with the Financial Research Institute of the Hungarian Ministry of Finance in the 1980s, and the efforts of the communist government of the time to achieve political and economic integration into the emerging system of global capitalism, in order to tackle the domestic economic crisis and growing indebtedness.[55]

Another approach to expert communities is demonstrated by sociologist Gil Eyal, who uses the example of how post-socialist elites came into being. He has attempted to show a different genealogy and thus a different mindset and behaviour of Czech and Slovak post-communist elites.[56] In the Czech case, he also analysed the composition of this elite, which was recruited from former dissidents and technocrats from the "grey zone", favourable to the neoliberal paradigm. His thesis on the synergy between neoliberal technocrats and the moralising anti-communism of former dissidents, which gave the former vital moral and historical legitimacy, is somewhat schematic and unconvincing, due to the limited range of sources and the cultural and political context. Nevertheless, the need to re-evaluate the political animosities within the Czech liberal camp in the 1990s in terms of their common vision of marketisation, pro-western orientation, and overall decommunization, which was indicated already years ago by Eyal, is a topical issue. His emphasis on the late-socialist social and cultural roots of the post-communist elites remains inspirational for our current historical enquiries.

Likewise, research on so-called "global socialism", or the relationship between East-Central European socialism and the so-called Third World during the Cold War period which was conducted for several years by an international research group headed by James Mark at the University of Exeter, devoted considerable attention to experts as distinctive actors in international affairs. After all, it was they who were often important if not the main actors of those levels of international relations and cooperation between the so-called second and third worlds, which the researchers at Exeter are not alone in labelling with the heuristic term of "alternative globalisation".[57] Follow-up research has shown that it was often a number of influential reform-minded communists and the expert advisory circles who played a fundamental role in the early stages of realigning forces not only within individual political regimes, but also in the longer term reformulation of positions vis-a-vis the rising norms of global capitalism and liberal internationalism. The pace of those developments sharply accelerated and became more evident after 1989. But in many countries, including the Soviet Union, it had been anticipated for several decades already, if not longer.[58]

In this connection, the Exeter Group also employs the term "long transition" referring to the "domestic" Eastern European roots of global restructuring of the world after 1989. They point to the fact that in contrast to most previous historical narratives about the "defeat" of communism by the globalising West, there is a need, in light of the "smooth" acceptance of the new global order in Eastern Europe after 1989, to reappraise the state-socialist East not only as a recipient but also an active promoter of global change and as the creator of its own "long revolution from within". For the same period, albeit with a somewhat different meaning, the term *lange Geschichte der "Wende"* / long history of the "turn-around" is employed by German historians researching the social and cultural history of everyday life. They use it to describe changes not at the level

of expert knowledge and the dynamic of specialist discourse, but at the level of everyday life and broadly shared social practices leading in the long term to fundamental change in the socio-cultural and socio-economic constitution of society.[59]

Our research is based on a dialogue with these international researches that were often pursued in parallel. We are convinced that if we wish to understand the "expert consensus" that emerged in Czechoslovakia and East-Central Europe at the end of the 1980s about the need for not just partial gradual reforms but fundamental changes and even "shock" remedies, then it is necessary to develop the analysis using the indicated "long change" approach. Drawing on the research of Bockman and others, we based ourselves on the premise that we needed more analyses along similar lines, but in relation not only to macroeconomists and experts in financial institutions, but also various other expert groups and to managerial and technocratic milieus. These analyses should provide further pieces of the mosaic of the historic change at the end of the 1980s, for instance – as we ourselves have tried to do – the emerging consensus of the "rule of law" in legal circles, the consensus about the primacy of economic rationality and the need for privatisation (in terms of the principle, not the scale) among enterprise managers, the shared paradigm of "self-optimization" among experts in psycho-disciplines, the vision of "flexible specialisation" and "gentrification" in urban planning, etc.

We believe that such research could help solve the fundamental question about 1989 common to all historians: how was it that the democratic revolutions of 1989, imbued with ideals of humanism, non-violence, democracy, freedom, and self-government, which, apart from Poland, did not comprise any liberal movement with a clearly defined programme, were transformed within a matter of a few months from broadly "democratic" revolutions into "liberal" revolutions? If we do not want to repeat the one-sided and no longer

very productive theory of the "global neoliberal captivity" of Eastern Europe by the colonising and predatory West, it is necessary conduct a fundamental re-examination of the concept of "liberal consensus" of the 1990s, which has tended to be used simply as a metaphor, a concept that gave rise to a kind of mirror image here of the Washington Consensus at the international level. The study of the expert communities in late socialism and early democratic capitalism is only one aspect of the problem, though by no means an insignificant one.

What the reader will find in the book

By focusing on the hypothetical continuity between two very different political and socio-economic systems before and after 1989 and trying to re-evaluate the significance of late-socialist experts and the technocratic roots for the post-1989 "neoliberal governance", we seek to historicise our present understanding of early post-socialism. In doing so we aim to contribute to the historicization of the ongoing academic and public debate about the alleged neoliberal hegemony in post-socialism advanced heretofore chiefly by sociologists, anthropologists and political economists.

Obviously, such historical analysis cannot immediately be implemented as systematic research. In our three-year research project, we therefore focused our work on several investigations of various expert environments, which all had differing levels of both "political clout" and the potential for public or non-public political intervention both before and after 1989. This is evident in the chapters that follow, for example, in the distinction between law and jurisprudence as one of the most prominent and influential spheres of governance throughout the period under study, and psychotherapy, which for a long time languished on the margins not only of the

political centre, but also largely of the expert circles of the psychodisciplines. However, differences can likewise manifest in time. As another chapter demonstrates, management theory, which fell within the central sphere of socialist economic management, was itself, despite relatively generous funding, a rather marginal phenomenon in the centrally planned economy. After 1989, however, management theory fundamentally changed and, in line with global trends, became one of the dominant discourses of renewed Czech and Slovak capitalism.

There are other differences between the expert communities we examined. Some of these expert milieus are more or less academic in character – such as sociology – while others are far more practical – such as ecology or urban planning. In the case of managers of socialist or later privatised enterprises, the practical aspect clearly prevails over that of expertise. In this respect, too, the selection of individual probes was deliberately intended to show the wide range and practical scope of different expert environments. By contrast, what unifies the chapters are three common elements. Firstly, we made an effort to examine the given period from the perspective of the actors in these expert milieus. As such, we favoured an "insider" perspective – and not just from within the expert disciplines themselves, but also in terms of their local social networking. Secondly, with due respect to the current trend of researching the transnational aspects of expert communities, our perspective is primarily rooted in the domestic context. The transnational dimension, such as in the form of contact and knowledge brokering between expert communities in each of these milieus, is undoubtedly important, but we treated it as part of a wider context and not per se. Finally, we are naturally linked by a temporal vantage point, or rather the question of how each expert milieu adjusted to the pressures, necessities and expectations of the "normalization regime" after 1969; how they reacted to the changes of at the time of *perestroika* and

the democratic revolution of 1989; and how these same actors coped with not only the fundamental changes in their social environment, but also their own understanding of their role as experts during the period of democratic renewal and transition to a capitalist market economy.

From our point of view, these are two distinct periods, in regard to both social-political systems and historical sources. For the period prior to 1989, sources from central state and party institutions and the security services are accessible – though often with extensive unprocessed material. For the period after 1989, the situation is quite the opposite; to date, only very few archival sources have been made available. The vast majority of research must therefore be carried out using publicly accessible documents and non-archival materials.

The central focus of our research is expert environments, not politics. At the same time, some of our chapters are concerned with the central spheres of governance and state administration, i.e. law and jurisprudence, or economic management. The first chapter deals with one of the central features of governance in the late socialist dictatorship, namely the legal system, including its authoritarian practice and how experts reflected on it. It endeavours to historicize our existing view of the period of "communist lawlessness" and point to the gradual processes of legalization within the dictatorship, which led in the late 1980s to the cautious yet perceptible inching towards a *perestroika*-style authoritarian "socialist rule of law" which evolved from the overall international situation in the Eastern Bloc under Mikhail Gorbachev, and at the same time from the regime's own "socialist legalism" confronted by "dissident legalism" of the human rights opposition. This development was a crucial prerequisite for the nonviolent, negotiated democratic revolution in late 1989 and early 1990, as well as for the complex problem of legal continuity during the re-establish-

ment of liberal democracy in Czechoslovakia. The chapter seeks to provide an overall outline of continuities and discontinuities of the period. However, given the vast expert environment of jurisprudence, it illustrates the field's development and its interconnection with forms of governance with specific reference to the prominent Czech legal expert and academic, Viktor Knapp.

Tomáš Vilímek's study considers the stratum of managers in large industrial enterprises, many of which belonged to privileged sectors of the national economy. Principally, the chapter analyses the professional and political behaviour of managers as representatives of an expert profession that was not only uniquely significant for stabilization and maintenance of the Czechoslovak communist regime, but also substantially contributed to its collapse and the subsequent transformation process. Because of their economic, social and socio-political role, these managers were constantly under surveillance from the political police and higher economic and political authorities. With the aid of the Communist Party and state security archival material, as well as samizdat publications, expert literature and interviews with key actors, the chapter analyses the status and function of corporate management in the "non-parametric environment" prior to 1989, the main features of its "game plan" strategy, the creation of the "trustworthy comrade" illusion, and nurturing the loyalty of the internal coalition within the enterprise. The chapter concludes by analysing how these managers reacted to the fundamental society-wide changes of the early 1990s, and to what extent they utilized their existing knowledge, experience, and acquired reflexes in the period of economic transformation, most importantly in relation to the privatization of state enterprises.

The next study focuses on the theoretical background of socialist enterprise management, or management theory, which had long been present in Czechoslovakia and institutionalised from the end

of the 1950s. Socialist management theory was an applied discipline, similar to the Western liberal theory of management. However, in communist Czechoslovakia, as in other Eastern European sovietised countries, management theory was specific in that it was adapted to centrally-planned, state-directed economies. Emblematic of this socialist-corporate managerialism was the primacy of political rationality, the requirement to fulfil the central plan, state-owned enterprises, equality of employees, and management efficiency understood primarily in terms of state administration rather than entrepreneurship. However, with time, deviations began to manifest within these core aspects of socialist management theory. These deviations concerned the strengthening of decision-making based on economic deliberation and the push for company independence and strategic planning autonomy – in other words, an emphasis on "socialist entrepreneurship."

The regime change in 1989 brought a fundamental change in the parameters of enterprise management. Political control vanished overnight and economic considerations became paramount: the profit motive, competitiveness in the marketplace, individual responsibility of directors, and managerial entrepreneurship. Domestic management theory, which was firmly embedded in Keynesian ideas of corporate managerialism, sought to make up for its conceptual and analytic "lag" in the first years following the revolution, was "steamrolled" after 1992 by the import of current Western managerialism.

As Adéla Gjuričová demonstrates in the following chapter, psychotherapy was also a field that experienced a huge professional and commercial boom after 1989. Yet until well into the 1980s, psychotherapy was an ambiguously defined discipline, somewhere between a complement to psychiatric treatment and marriage counselling, on the one hand, and the only existing, semi-official psychotherapeutic training, on the other. The author asks to what

extent can we observe a "therapeutization of society," characterized by the permeation of psychotherapy principles beyond the therapeutic sphere and to what extent did this expert environment contribute towards the paradigmatic change towards market capitalism and liberal individualism? Her study concludes that psychotherapists were not direct stakeholders of power in state socialism but were able, nevertheless, to take ample advantage of state resources. For the founders of the first therapeutic training in the country, the principle of therapeutic individualism represented a way, however momentary, to breach the rules of state socialism, and in doing so, they forged a strong collective identity. Thus, the shift to ubiquitous "self-management" was very inconsistent, even after the advent of capitalism in 1990.

Sociologists, too, were not directly involved in wielding power during the communist dictatorship, a point I explore in the chapter that follows. Yet, the regime vitally needed their expertise and social engineering techniques. The study examines the overall status of social research and sociology in Czechoslovakia under the post-1968 consolidation regime, with specific reference to the central legitimizing doctrine of that era, i.e. the theory of the Scientific and Technological Revolution and its offshoots of social planning and social forecasting. The direct application of sociological expertise in the dictatorship's authoritarian practice is tracked through selected examples of applied sociological research, such as the sociology of the socialist enterprise, and public opinion polls. The chapter takes another example – the sociology of the socialist way of life – to analyse how, at the very epicentre of official Marxist-Leninist sociology, the heterodox paradigm of participatory prognostics came into being, and anticipated democratization and an active civil society well before 1989. The chapter's final section examines the development of "liberated" sociology after the democratic revolution in Czechoslovakia, its boom as an academ-

ic discipline and its complicated relationship with the emerging democratic politics.

Matěj Spurný's study focuses on the role of ecological expertise and criticism in the closing years of state socialism and the early years of liberal capitalism in Czechoslovakia. He highlights the problematic character of the proclaimed dichotomy between "small scale" and "large scale" ecology in late socialism and stresses the interconnectedness of a variety of approaches to the environment, from tramping clubs and dissidents to specialists fully incorporated into the structures of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences. Given the described synergy of these activities and their significant role in the process of delegitimizing state socialism, the question arises whether and in what way environmental experts subsequently helped pave the way for post-socialist governance. Spurný points not only to the disintegration of the ecological movement in post-communist Czechoslovakia, but also to the truly divergent and often mutually incompatible paths taken by experts in this sphere, as well as the uncertainty and frequent failure of attempts to recast ecological critique and expertise in the language and practice of liberal democratic politics.

In his chapter, Petr Roubal examines to what extent changes in the discourse of Prague town planners in the decade before November 1989 contributed to the neoliberalization of the capital's city policies in the early 1990s. Urban governance after 1989 was characterized by "urbanist anticommunism," which manifested itself in profound scepticism, eventually leading to the rejection of urban planning as a domain of expert decision-making (abolition of Prague's Chief Architect's Department in 1994). Although the neoliberal shift had not been part of urbanist discourse prior to 1989, by their systematic criticism of urbanist modernism – explored here with reference to what happened in Žižkov and Stromovka – critical urbanists created the intellectual conditions for this reversal and thereby also the

practical conditions for the destruction of their own field of expertise. Roubal studies how this post-1989 position contrasts with the urbanists' relationship with the regime during state socialism, when planning the future of cities was unrestrained by market forces, which in fact is what made socialist cities socialist. The author concludes that the example of the urban planners demonstrates that the concept of experts under socialism as a "grey zone" underestimates their role in the system of governance.

Our monograph is an assemblage of research studies, not a synthesizing account. We do not attempt to describe the "grey zone" or the expert environment in its entirety. We are aware that while our inquiries share some common elements and perspectives, we are often telling quite different stories, as we each work with materials and histories of very different expert communities – and at this phase of research we do not want to force these into a single common denominator. Nevertheless, our research displays certain general parallels and common developmental trends that I would like to highlight in conclusion.

Without anticipating it at the outset of our research, we found that all our cases revealed a striking continuity between the 1960s and the 1970s, which somewhat undermines the entrenched political narrative about the reformist and "normalization" periods. From the perspective of development in our expert disciplines, there is an evident continuity in the techniques and innovation methods between both decades. The 1960s were the main decade of socialist modernization, a new phase of technocratic governance, as well as innovative thinking and methodology in much of scientific research, both basic and applied. In spite of the purges and conspicuous politicization and ideologization of the early 1970s, a significant portion of this innovative potential was absorbed into the framework of the nascent "normalization regime," i.e. into its social-engineering techniques of governance and social control. This sheds rather un-

conventional light on "Husák's consolidation," that contrasts with the contemporary interpretation of normalisation as "neo-Stalinisation." In the case of the expert disciplines in our monograph, it appeared more like modernized, technocratic authoritarianism with some totalitarian features. In other words, a party dictatorship and a return of ideological orthodoxy – a return to Leninist rather than Stalinist rhetoric – associated with further development of technocratic rule and "soft" social engineering.[60]

This became apparent during the research itself. Although our original intention was to begin with a concise characterization of the normalization period and then quickly move on to the perestroika period, in almost all cases we felt the need to devote some space to the "founding" period of the given expert milieus' transformation in the 1960s, without which further exposition would be incomprehensible. Our findings shed interesting light on the thesis, frequently discussed in current research, regarding the endurance of so-called late socialism as post-Stalinism with various phases, either reform-based or consolidation-based, which cyclically alternated.[61]

All the expert fields that we investigated were under strict state and party supervision and received state support, which prescribed and conserved certain practices and behaviour, while at the same time providing space for experimentation, and sometimes "quiet" innovations – and sometimes, as shown in several of our studies, "louder" ones. Even so, changes in many of the observed fields were quite radical; but it was important that they did not disturb the impression of stability and continuity, or the preservation of the basic pillars of communist governance. In some fields, the trend towards "louder" innovation was stronger, such as in ecology, sociology and urban planning. In other fields innovation came about "quietly" under the protection of other institutions and wider projects, as seen in the case of psychotherapy. In yet other cases the innovation potential of the expert environ-

ment was relatively negligible, and visible only in close study; such is the case with jurisprudence, in a large part undoubtedly due to the fact that law was and remains central to the execution of state power and governance. Innovation in this field, for example by promoting the concept of the "rule of law" – in the ideological, not scientific or expert, sense – arose instead from the dissident sphere, not official jurisprudence. This relates to another issue, namely the often fine line between experts and civic activists, as evidenced in several of our chapters, including those on ecology, urban studies, sociology and psychotherapy. Incidentally, the dissident community and its manifold connections to expert groups, often those we cover in our monograph, is a topic worthy of separate research. In much the same way, the international and transnational networks and contacts of individual expert communities should be a subject of special study. Although not our chief topic of interest, international contacts (primarily with the West) nevertheless endured, albeit substantially limited in the period of early normalization, and played an important role in transferring ideas as well as being a benchmark for comparing the situation in specific expert fields and in society in general, both at home and abroad.

Practically all our chapters present a highly dynamic picture of the perestroika period, despite the ostensible official stagnation in Czechoslovakia. The expert and management environment clearly anticipated and reflected the tectonic changes in society and in the international environment of the Eastern Bloc much more sensitively, and so in the second half of the 1980s, in terms of dynamism, it was in places quite different from the environment of superficial and feigned perestroika reforms in the uppermost echelons of the communist leadership.

Equally dynamic and active was the experience of the democratic revolution in expert circles. Experts (though by no means all) wel-

comed and supported these changes, and often even stood at the centre of the democratization movement and early transformation, where one can trace their partially successful efforts to apply their knowledge, visions, plans and innovations. At the same time, however, between 1991 and 1993, a fundamental paradigm shift occurred in most disciplines in connection with the progress of Europeanization, commercialisation, the establishment of a private sector, etc. The process of adopting contemporary Western models and coping with their often problematic implementation only truly took place in those years. This demonstrates that "our" experts were not preparing for a "neoliberal transformation," at least not consciously. Nonetheless, they comprised a key social stratum that was mediating a fundamental "liberal" change, one that was historically exceptionally rapid, but on closer inspection, not immediate after 1989. In other words, although we are accustomed to see 1989 as a symbolic milestone, if we wish to understand the fundamental changes taking place in Czech and Slovak societies during this period, it is imperative to pay close attention to the dynamic temporality of the years immediately following the democratic revolution, when the distance "travelled" from the initial conditions at the end of 1989 to the state reached by mid 1993 would correspond in "normal" historical time to at least one, if not several, decades.

Acknowledgements

From the outset our research was a collective endeavour, and not simply in the sense of team work. It was necessary to work through a large amount of source material and analyse often very extensive spheres of development of the various expert milieus over several decades.

We would have never coped with this task without the help of our student research assistants, and I would like to thank in first

place these colleagues who were mostly students in their final years of study or doctoral cycles at the Arts and Humanities faculties of Charles University. They are Michaela Lenčéšová, Kristina Andělová, Václav Rameš, Vojtěch Pojar, Martina Poliaková and Cyril Poliačik.

Historians, in a sense, are always dabblers when researching past milieus about which they have not been "expertly" schooled. Moreover "the past is a foreign country" as the British novelist L. P. Hartley once wrote, "they do things differently there." In the case of contemporary history, however, they have the advantage of being able to talk about that "foreign country" with "the locals" or with those who have already visited that "foreign country". The assistance of colleagues from the professions whose recent past we are dealing with, and their willingness to advise us and often be the first to read the draft versions of our chapters, was particularly welcome and valuable for us, although we naturally bear entire responsibility for the results. We wish to thank by name our colleagues Bohumila Baštecká, Tomáš Bursík, Marie Černá, Karolína Dvorská, Waltraud Ernst, Slavomíra Ferenčuhová, Šárka Gjuričová, Miloš Havelka, Zdeněk Kühn, Daniel Kunštát, György Majtényi, James Mark, Sarah Marks, Thomas Müller, Libora Oates-Indruchová, Jana Osterkamp, Jiří Přibáň, Jakub Rákosník, Vítězslav Sommer, Jiří Suk, Radka Šustrová and Michael Voříšek. Particular thanks are due to both reviewers of the book, Milena Bartlová and Martina Winkler, for their critical assessment of the entire manuscript, their many excellent suggestions and their readiness to adapt to the rather hectic pace of the final operations. Of enormous importance to us were the broader discussions particularly with a number of local and international research projects dealing with similar issues, and with which we organised joint international workshops and conferences in Prague in 2016 and in Jena in 2018, or took part with them in events organised in November 2015 in Exeter and June 2017 in

Potsdam. We also thank Gerald Turner for his careful and readable translation of the English version of the monograph, and Karolinum Press for their helpfulness in publishing the English version of the publication.

NOTES

1 Cf. DANIEL T. RODGERS, *The Age of Fracture*, Cambridge 2011; IVAN KRASTEV, *After Europe*, Pennsylvania 2017; idem, "3 Versions of Europe Are Collapsing at the Same Time," *Foreign Policy*, 10 June 2018; IVAN KRASTEV, STEPHEN HOLMES, *The Light that Failed: How the West Won the Cold War and Lost the Peace*, London 2019.

2 Cf. some recent attempts: JAMES MARK, BOGDAN C. IACOB, TOBIAS RUPPRECHT, LJUBICA SPASKOVKA, *1989: Eastern Europe and the Making of the Modern World*, Cambridge 2019; ÁGNES GAGYI, "Hungary's 'Lex CEU' and the State of the Open Society: Looking Beyond the Story of Democratic Revolutions", *Cultures of History Forum*, http://www.cultures-of-history.uni-jena.de/focus/lex-ceu/hungarys-lex-ceu-and-the-state-of-the-open-society-looking--beyond-the-story-of-democratic-revolutions/.

3 PAUL D. ALIGICA, ANTHONY J. EVANS, *The Neoliberal Revolution in Eastern Europe: Economic Ideas in the Transition from Communism*, Northampton 2009.

4 DAN STONE, *Goodbye to All That: The Story of Europe since 1945*, Oxford 2014, pp. 179–195; STUART HALL, "The Neoliberal Revolution," *Cultural Studies* 25/2011, pp. 705–728.

5 JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, *Globalization and Its Discontents*, New York 2002.

6 PETER GOWAN, "Neo-Liberal Theory and Practice for Eastern Europe", *New Left Review* 213/1995, pp. 3–60; DAVID HARVEY, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*, Oxford 2005; NAOMI KLEIN, *The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism*, London 2007. A more detailed examination of how that "laboratory" functioned is provided by JOHANNA BOCKMAN, GIL EYAL, "Eastern Europe as a Laboratory for Economic Knowledge: The Transnational Roots of Neoliberalism", *American Journal of Sociology* 108/2002, pp. 310–352.

7 JUDIT BODNÁR, *Fin de millénaire Budapest: metamorphoses of urban life*, Minneapolis 2001; GIL EYAL, *The Origins of Postcommunist Elites: From Prague Spring to the Breakup of Czechoslovakia*, Minneapolis 2003.

8 DON KALB, GÁBOR HALMAI (eds.), *Headlines of nations, subtexts of class: working class populism and the return of the repressed in neoliberal Europe*, New York 2011; DAVID OST, *The Defeat of Solidarity: Anger and Politics in Post-Communist Europe*, Ithaca 2005.

9 Cf. for instance ELIZABETH C. DUNN, *Privatizing Poland: baby food, big business, and the remaking of the Polish working class*, Ithaca 2004; LEYLA J. KEOUGH, "Globalizing 'Postsocialism': Mobile Mothers and Neoliberalism on the Margins of Europe", *Anthropological Quarterly* 79/2006, pp. 431–461.

10 MARTIN MYANT, JAN DRAHOKOUPIL, *Transition Economies. Political Economy in Russia, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia,* Hoboken NJ, 2010; DAVID LANE, MARTIN MYANT, *Varieties of Capitalism in Post-Communist Countries,* Basingstoke 2007; MARTIN MYANT, *The Rise and*

Fall of Czech Capitalism, Cheltenham 2003; DOROTHEE BOHLE, BÉLA GRESKOVITS, *Capitalist Diversity on Europe's Periphery*, Ithaca 2012.

11 VENELIN I. GANEV, "The 'Triumph of Neoliberalism' Reconsidered: Critical Remarks on Ideas-Centered Analyses of Political and Economic Change in Post-Communism", *East European Politics and Societies* 19/2005, pp. 343–378.

12 PHILIP MIROWSKI, DIETER PLEHWE (eds.), *The Road from Mont Pèlerin. The Making of the Neoliberal Thought Collective*, Harvard 2009; DANIEL STEDMAN JONES, *Masters of the Universe: Hayek, Friedman, and the Birth of Neoliberal Politics*, Princeton 2012; QUINN SLOBODIAN, *Globalists: The End of Empire and the Birth of Neoliberalism*, Cambridge Mass, 2018.

13 DAVID HARVEY, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*; NAOMI KLEIN, *The Shock Doctrine*; COLIN CROUCH, *The Strange Non-death of Neo-liberalism*, Hoboken 2011.

14 PETER MILLER, NIKOLAS ROSE (eds.), *Governing the Present: Administering Economic, Social and Personal Life*, Cambridge 2008; MARK BEVIR, "Rethinking governmentality. Towards genealogies of governance", *European Journal of Social Theory* 13/2010, pp. 423–441; MITCHELL DEAN, "Liberal government and authoritarianism", *Economy and Society* 31/2002, pp. 37–61; DAVID CHANDLER, JULIAN REID, *The Neoliberal Subject. Resilience, Adaptation and Vulnerability*, London 2016.

15 DANIEL ZAMORA, MICHAEL C. BEHRENT (eds.), *Foucault and Neoliberalism*, Cambridge 2015. Cf. also some thematic issues of the journal *Foucault Studies*, including No. 9/2006 *Neoliberal Governmentality*; No. 18/2014 *Ethnographies of Neoliberal Governmentalities.*

16 Cf. RAJESH VENUGOPAL, "Neoliberalism as concept", *Economy and Society* 44/2015, pp. 165–187; TERRY FLEW, "Six theories of neoliberalism", *Thesis Eleven* 122/2014, No. 1, pp. 49–71.

17 PETER WAGNER, *A Sociology of Modernity. Liberty and Discipline*, London 1994.

18 FREDRIC JAMESON, *Postmodernism, or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism*, Durham 1991; D. T. RODGERS, *The Age of Fracture;* GÖRAN THERBORN, GEOFF ELAY, HARMUT KAELBLE, PHILIPPE CHASSAIGNE, "The 1970s and 1980s as a Turning Point in European History?", *Journal of Modern European History* 9/2011, pp. 8–26; NIALL FERGUSON, CHARLES S. MAIER, EREZ MANELA, DANIEL J. SARGENT (eds.), *Shock of the Global: the 1970s in Perspective*, Cambridge (Mass.) 2011.

19 JÜRGEN KOCKA, *Geschichte des Kapitalismus*, Munich 2013; JÜRGEN KOCKA, MARCEL VAN DEN LINDEN (eds.), *Capitalism: The Reemergence of a Historical Concept*, London 2016; GEOFFREY M. HODGSON, *Conceptualizing Capitalism: Institutions, Evolution, Future*, Chicago–London 2015.

20 GÉRARD DUMÉNIL, DOMINIQUE LÉVY, *Managerial Capitalism: Ownership, Management & the Coming of New Mode of Production*, London 2018.

21 TONY CLIFF, *State Capitalism in Russia*, London 1996; CHRIS HARMAN, *Zombie Capitalism: Global Crisis and the Relevance of Marx*, London 2009.

22 PHILIPP THER, *Europe since 1989: A History*, Princeton 2016.

23 MICHAL KOPEČEK, "Towards the 'History of Meaning' of 1989", *East Central Europe* 46/2019.

24 CORNEL BAN, *Ruling Ideas: How Global Neoliberalism Goes Local,* New York 2016; JULIET JOHNSON, *Priests of Prosperity. How Central Bankers Transformed the Post Communist World*,

Ithaca 2016. Cf. also an attempt to compare Thatcherism in the country of its birth with its "Czech version" in the form of the ideology and practice of Czech liberal conservatism of the 1990s: GERALD POWER, JAROSLAV WEINFURTER, *Thatcherismus v českých zemích. Vývoj a recepce*, Prague 2015.

25 Cf. especially CORNEL BAN, *Ruling Ideas*, op. cit.

26 Cf. for instance LÁSZLÓ BRUSZT, DAVID STARK, *Postsocialist Pathways: Transforming Politics and Property in East Central Europe*, Cambridge 1998; JADWIGA STANISZKIS, "Post-communism: The Emerging Enigma, Institute of Political Studies", *Polish Academy of Sciences*, 1999.

27 Cf. JOHANNA K. BOCKMAN, *Markets in the Name of Socialism: Left-Wing Origins of Neoliberalism*, Stanford 2011; GIL EYAL, *The Origins of Postcommunist Elites, From Prague Spring to the Breakup of Czechoslovakia*, Minneapolis 2003; TADEUSZ KOWALIK, *www.polskatransformacja.pl*, Warsaw 2009.

28 D. HARVEY, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*; P. D. ALIGICA, A. J. EVANS, *The Neoliberal Revolution in Eastern Europe.*

29 Cf. IVO MOŽNÝ, *Proč tak snadno: Některé rodinné důvody sametové revoluce*, Prague 1991.

30 JIŘINA ŠIKLOVÁ, "The Gray Zone and the Future of Dissent in Czechoslovakia", *Social Research* 57/1990, pp. 347–363.

31 JADWIGA STANISZKIS, "'Political Capitalism' in Poland", *East European Politics and Societies* 5/1991, pp. 127–141.

32 ROMAN FRYDMAN, KENNETH MURPHY, ANDRZEJ RAPACZYŃSKI, *Capitalism with a Comrade's Face: Studies in the Post-Communist Transition*, Budapest–New York 1998.

33 GIL EYAL, IVÁN SZELÉNYI, ELEANOR TOWNSLEY, *Making Capitalism without capitalists: Class Formation and Elite Struggles in Post -communist Central Europe*, London 1998, particularly pp. 113–158.

34 ANDRÁS BOZÓKI, *Intellectuals and Politics in Central Europe*, Budapest-New York 1999; ERZSÉBET SZALAI, *Az elitek átváltozása. Tanulmányok és publicisztikai írások 1994–1996*, Budapest 1998.

35 SZONJA SZELÉNYI, IVÁN SZELÉNYI, IMRE KOVÁCH, "The Making of the Hungarian Postcommunist Elite: Circulation in Politics, Reproduction in the Economy", *Theory and Society* 24/1995, pp. 697–722; JOHN HIGLEY, JAN PAKULSKI, WLODZIMIERZ WESOLOWSKI, *Postcommunist Elites and Democracy in Eastern Europe*, London 1998; MILAN TUČEK, *České elity patnáct let po pádu komunismu*, Prague 2006.

36 Cf. STEVEN FULLER, *The Sociology of Intellectual Life. The Career of the Mind in and Around Academy*, London 2009, STANISLAV HUBÍK, *Sociologie vědění*, Prague 1999.

37 GIL EYAL, LARISSA BUCHHOLZ, "From the Sociology of Intellectuals to the Sociology of Interventions", *Annual Review of Sociology* 36/2010, pp. 117–137.

38 GIL EYAL, "For a Sociology of Expertise: The Social Origins of the Autism Epidemic", *American Journal of Sociology*, 118/2013, pp. 863–907; ROBERT EVANS, "The Sociology of Expertise: The Distribution of Social Fluency", *Sociology Compass* 2/2008, pp. 281–298.

39 PETER HAAS, "Introduction: epistemic communities and international policy co-ordination", *International Organization* 46/1992, pp. 1–35; MAI'A K. DAVIS CROSS, "Re-thinking Epistemic Communities Twenty Years Later", *Review of International Studies* 39/2013, pp. 137–160.

40 Cf. for instance HANS-JÜRGEN WAGENER, *Economic Thought in Communist and Post-Communist Europe*, London-New York 1998; JÁNOS M. KOVÁCS, VIOLETTA ZENTAI, *Capitalism from Outside? Economic Cultures in Eastern Europe after 1989*, Budapest–New York 2013.

41 RUDOLF L. TŐKÉS, *Hungary's Negotiated Revolution: Economic Reform, Social Change, and Political Succession, 1957–1990*, Cambridge 1996; ANTONI DUDEK, *Reglamentowana rewolucja. Rozkład dyktatury komunistycznej w Polsce 1988–1990*, Kraków 2004; PAWEŁ KOWAL, *Koniec systemu władzy. Polityka ekipy gen. Wojciecha Jaruzelskiego w latach 1986–1989*, Warsaw 2012; ANDRÁS BOZÓKI (eds.), *The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy*, Budapest–New York 2002.

42 MILAN OTÁHAL, *Podíl tvůrčí inteligence na pádu komunismu*, Brno 1999.

43 MICHAL PULLMANN, *Konec experimentu: přestavba a pád komunismu v Československu*, Prague 2011, particularly pp. 19–39.

44 DAVIDE RODOGNO, BERHARD STRUCK, JAKOB VOGEL (eds.), *Shaping the Transnational Sphere: Experts, Networks and Issues from the 1840s to the 1930s*, London 2014; MARTIN KOHLRAUSCH, KATRIN STEFFEN, STEFAN WIEDERKEHR (eds.), *Expert Cultures in Central Eastern Europe: The Internationalization of Knowledge and the Transformation of Nation States since World War I*, Osnabrück 2010.

45 Cf. MICHEL CHRISTIAN, SANDRINE KOTT, ONDŘEJ MATĚJKA (eds.), *Planning in Cold War Europe: Competition, Cooperation, Circulations (1950s–1970s)*, Berlin-Boston 2018; SANDRINE KOTT, JOËLLE DROUX, *Globalizing social rights: The International Labour Organization and Beyond*, London 2013; BOGDAN C. IACOB, CORINA DOBOŞ, RALUCA GROSESCU, VIVIANA IACOB, VLAD PAŞCA, "State Socialist Experts in Transnational Perspective. East European Circulation of Knowledge during the Cold War (1950s–1980s)", *East Central Europe* 45/2018, pp. 145–300.

46 JAN JANKO, EMILIE TĚŠÍNSKÁ (eds.), *Technokracie v českých zemích (1900–1950)*, Prague 1999; JAKUB RÁKOSNÍK, *Sovětizace sociálního státu*, Prague 2010; JAKUB RÁKOSNÍK, IGOR TOMEŠ, *Sociální stát v Československu: Právně-institucionální vývoj v letech 1918–1992*, Prague 2013; JAKUB RÁKOSNÍK, RADKA ŠUSTROVÁ, *Rodina v zájmu státu: Populační růst a instituce manželství v českých zemích, 1918–1989*, Prague 2016.

47 DOUBRAVKA OLŠÁKOVÁ, *Věda jde k lidu! Československá společnost pro šíření politických a vědeckých znalostí a popularizace věd v Československu ve 20. století*, Prague 2014; DOUBRAVKA OLŠÁKOVÁ (ed.), *In the Name of the Great Work: Stalin's Plan for the Transformation of Nature and its Impact in Eastern Europe*, New York–Oxford 2016; JIŘÍ JANÁČ, DOUBRAVKA OLŠÁKOVÁ, *Kult jednoty: stalinský plán přetvoření přírody v Československu 1948–1964*, Prague 2018.

48 JIŘÍ HOPPE, MARKÉTA ŠKODOVÁ, JIŘÍ SUK, FRANCESCO CACCAMO, *"O nový československý model socialismu". Čtyři interdisciplinární týmy při ČSAV a UK v 60. letech*, Prague 2015; JIŘÍ SUK, *Veřejné záchodky ze zlata. Konflikt mezi komunistickým utopismem a ekonomickou racionalitou v předsrpnovém Československu*, Prague 2016.

49 VÍTĚZSLAV SOMMER, "Forecasting the Post-Socialist Future. Prognostika in Late Socialist Czechoslovakia, 1970–1989", in: *The Struggle for the Long-Term in Transnational Science and Politics. Forging the Future*, (eds.) Jenny Andersson, Egle Rindzevičiute, New York–London 2015, pp. 144–160. VÍTĚZSLAV SOMMER, "Vom sozialistischen Postindustrialismus zur

Marktgesellschaft: Zukunftsforschung in der Tschechoslowakei (1960er–1980er Jahre)", *Bohemia* 57/2017, pp. 55–81; MATĚJ SPURNÝ, *Most do budoucnosti: Laboratoř socialistické modernity na severu Čech*, Prague 2016.

50 JIŘÍ JANÁČ, DOUBRAVKA OLŠÁKOVÁ, VÍTĚZSLAV SOMMER, MATĚJ SPURNÝ, "Technokratischer Sozialismus in der Tschechoslowakei*", Bohemia* 57/2017, pp. 12–24.

51 VÍTĚZSLAV SOMMER (ed.), *Řídit socialismus jako firmu: Proměny technokratického vládnutí v Československu, 1956–1989*, Prague 2019.

52 HANA HAVELKOVÁ, "(De)centralizovaná genderová politika. Role Státní populační komise", in: *Vyvlastněný hlas. Proměny genderové kultury české společnosti 1948–1989*, (eds.) HANA HAVELKOVÁ, LIBORA OATES-INDRUCHOVÁ, Prague 2015, pp. 125–168.

53 H. HAVELKOVÁ, op. cit., p. 138.

54 J. K. BOCKMAN, *Markets in the Name of Socialism*.

55 ÁGNES GAGYI, "Reform Economics at the Financial Research Institute in Late Socialist Hungary: A Case of Globally Embedded Knowledge Production." *Intersections. East European Journal of Society and Politics* 1/2015, pp. 59–79.

56 GIL EYAL, *The Origins of Postcommunist Elites*, Minneapolis 2003.

57 ARTEMY KALINOVSKY, JAMES MARK, STEFFI MARUNG (eds.), *Alternative Globalisations: Encounters Between the Eastern Bloc and the Postcolonial World,* Indiana University Press 2020; NIKOLAY R. KARKOV, ZHIVKA VALIAVICHARSKA, "Rethinking East-European Socialism: Notes Toward an Anti-Capitalist Decolonial Methodology", *Interventions* 20/2018, pp. 758–813.

58 J. MARK, B. IACOB, T. RUPPRECHT, L. SPASKOVKA, *1989: Eastern Europe and the Making of the Modern World.*

59 Cf. for instance KERSTIN BRÜCKWEH, "Unter ostdeutschen Dächern. Wohneigentum zwischen Enteignung, Aneignung und Neukonstituierung der Lebenswelt in der langen Geschichte der 'Wende'", in: *Deutschland seit 1990. Wege in die Vereinigungsgesellschaft*, THOMAS GROßBÖLTING, CHRISTOPH LORKE (Hg.), Stuttgart 2017, pp. 187–212; KERSTIN BRÜCKWEH, KATHRIN ZÖLLER, "Transformation Research and the Longue Durée of 1989: Combining Qualitative and Quantitative Data", *Przegląd Socjologii Jakościowej – Qualitative Sociology Review* 2019.

60 VÍTĚZSLAV SOMMER (ed.), *Řídit socialismus jako firmu*: *Technokratické vládnutí v Československu 1956–1989*, Prague 2019.

61 PAVEL KOLÁŘ, *Der Poststalinismus: Ideologie und Utopie einer Epoche*, Cologne–Weimar–Vienna 2016.

RULING BY LAW: CZECH JURISPRUDENCE FROM "REPRESSIVE LEGALITY" TO THE RULE OF LAW, 1969–1994

Michal Kopeček

During the late-communist dictatorship in Czechoslovakia, an authoritarian concept of law and its strict observance represented a fundamental instrument of relatively non-violent governance and "normalisation of rule", i.e. establishing certain specific forms of management and control of society, which were regarded as standard and routine, albeit by no means unproblematic.[1] In this respect the local communists were no different from their counterparts in other countries of communist Eastern Europe. After 1989, "the rule of law" became the central concept in the political transformation of communist dictatorship into a pluralist liberal democracy. Understanding the multifaceted role of law and legal practice is crucial to historical understanding of late state socialism and the post–1989 democratic regime, and hence also the transition between the two systems. From the outset, however, there was an awareness of the contradiction between legality and legitimacy, or the paradox of the fictitious "legalist revolution" of 1989, expressed in constitutional and legal forms, as against the need for the nascent democracy to have robust legitimacy based on rejection of the "old order" of the communist ideocratic dictatorship and its "socialist legality". It was not simply a question of exchanging one type of legitimation practice for another, but transition to a system in which the fundamental purpose of legality is not to underpin the construction of a social consensus, but to preserve political pluralism and hence also the heterogeneity or even contrariety of legitimation strategies. As the sociologist of law, Jiří Přibáň, once pointed out, in liberal democracy "legality must be 'leaky' not sovereign, if it is to maintain its legitimizing capacity."[2]

Much has been written about law and legal practice in this period in Czechoslovakia and Czechia, as well as in other countries of East-Central Europe. Legal scholars as qualified experts in the field have yet to be the subject of thorough historical analysis, however.[3] This is

Vážení čtenáři, právě jste dočetli ukázku z knihy ***Architects of Long Change*.**
Pokud se Vám ukázka líbila, na našem webu si můžete zakoupit celou knihu.